1. Many pro-European commentators favorably compared the readiness of the new Eastern European members of the union to bear financial sacrifices to the egotistic, intransigent behavior of the U.K., France, Germany, and other old members; however, one should also bear in mind the hypocrisy of Slovenia and other new Eastern European members; they behaved as the latest members of an exclusive club, wanting to be the last allowed to enter. While accusing France of racism, they themselves opposed the entry of Turkey.
Against the Populist Temptation Slavoj Ž ižek
The French and Dutch no to the project of a European constitution was a clear-cut case of what in "French theory" is referred to as a floating signifier: a no of confused, inconsistent, overdetermined meanings, a kind of container in which the defense of workers' rights coexists with racism, in which the blind reaction to a perceived threat and fear of change coexist with vague utopian hopes. We are told that the no was really a no to many other things: to Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism, to Chirac and the present French government, to the influx of immigrant workers from Poland who lower the wages of French workers, and so on. The real struggle is going on now: the struggle for the meaning of this no-who will appropriate it? Who-if anyone-will translate it into a coherent alternate political vision?
If there is a predominant reading of the no, it is a new variation on the old Clinton motto, "It's the economy, stupid!"-the no was supposedly a reaction to Europe's economic lethargy, falling behind with regard to other newly emerging blocks of economic power, its economic, social, and ideologico-political inertia-but, paradoxically, an inappropriate reaction, a reaction on behalf of this very inertia of the privileged Europeans, of those who want to stick to old welfare state privileges. It was the reaction of "old Europe," triggered by the fear of any true change, the refusal of the uncertainties of the Brave New World of globalist modernization.
1 No wonder that the reaction of "official" Europe was one of near-panic at the dangerous, "irrational," racist, and isolationist passions that sustained the no, at a parochial rejection of openness and liberal multiculturalism. One is used to hearing complaints about the growing apathy among voters, about the decline of popular participation in politics, so worried liberals talk all the time about the need to mobilize people in the guise of civil society initiatives, to engage them more in a political process. However, when people awaken from their apolitical slumber, it is as a rule in the guise of a rightist populist revolt-no wonder many enlightened technocratic liberals now wonder whether that "apathy" had not been a blessing in disguise.
One should be attentive here to how even those elements that appear as pure rightist racism are effectively a displaced version of workers' protests. Of course it is racist to demand the end of immigration of foreign workers who pose a threat to our employment; however, one should bear in mind the simple fact that the influx of immigrant workers from post-Communist countries is not the consequence of some multiculturalist tolerance. It effectively is part of the strategy of capital to hold in check the workers' demands; this is why, in the U.S., Bush did more for the legalization of the status of Mexican illegal immigrants than the Democrats caught in trade union pressures. So, ironically, the rightist racist populism is today the best argument that the "class struggle," far from being "obsolete," goes on. The lesson the Left should learn from it is that one should not commit the error symmetrical to that of the populist racist mystification/displacement of hatred onto foreigners and throw the baby out with the bathwater or to merely oppose populist anti-immigrant racism on behalf of multiculturalist openness, obliterating its displaced class content. Benevolent as it wants to be, the mere insistence on multiculturalist openness is the most perfidious form of antiworkers class struggle.
Typical here is the reaction of German mainstream politicians to the formation of the new Linkspartei for the 2005 elections, a coalition of the East German PDS and the leftist dissidents of the SPD. Joschka Fischer himself reached one of the lowest points in his career when he called Oscar Lafontaine "a German Haider" (because Lafontaine protested the import of cheap East European labor to lower the wages of German workers). It is symptomatic that the political (and even cultural) establishment reacted in an exaggerated and panicky way when Lafontaine referred to "foreign workers" or when the secretary of the SPD called the financial speculators "loSlavoj Ž iž ek, psychoanalyst and dialectical-materialist philosopher, is codirector of the International Center for the Humanities, University of London. His most recent book is entitled The Parallax View (2006) . (London, 2005) ; hereafter abbreviated OPR.
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custs"-as if we are witnessing a full neo-Nazi revival. This total political blindness, this loss of the very capacity to distinguish between the Left and the Right, betrays a panic at politicization as such. The automatic dismissal of entertaining any thoughts outside the established postpolitical coordinates as "populist demagoguery" is hitherto the purest proof that we effectively live under a new Denkverbot. (The tragedy, of course, is that the Linkspartei effectively is a pure protest party with no global, viable program of change.)
Populism: From the Antinomies of the Concept
The French-Dutch no thus presents us with the latest adventure in the story of populism. For the enlightened liberal-technocratic elite, populism is inherently protofascist, the demise of political reason, a revolt in the guise of the outburst of blind utopian passions. The easiest reply to this distrust would be to claim that populism is inherently neutral: a kind of transcendental-formal political dispositif that can be incorporated into different political engagements. This option was elaborated in detail by Ernesto Laclau.
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For Laclau, in a nice case of self-reference, the very logic of hegemonic articulation applies also to the conceptual opposition between populism and politics: populism is the Lacanian objet a of politics, the particularfigure which stands for the universal dimension of the political, which is why it is the royal road to understanding the political. Hegel provided a term for this overlapping of the universal with part of its own particular content: "oppositional determination" (gegensätzliche Bestimmung), the point at which the universal genus encounters itself among its particular species. Populism is not a specific political movement, but the political at its purest-the "inflection" of the social space that can affect any political content. Its elements are purely formal, "transcendental," not ontic; populism occurs when a series of particular "democratic" demands (for better social security, health services, lower taxes, peace, and so on) is enchained in a series of equivalences, and this enchainment produces "people" as the universal political subject. What characterizes populism is not the ontic content of these demands but the mere formal fact that, through their enchainment, "people" emerges as a political subject, and all different particular struggles and antagonisms appear as parts of a global antagonistic struggle between "us" (people) and "them." Again, the content of "us" and "them" is not prescribed in advance but, precisely, the stakes of the struggle for hegemony; even ideological elements like brutal racism and anti-Semitism can be en-chained in a populist series of equivalences, in the way "them" is constructed.
It is clear now why Laclau prefers populism to class struggle: populism provides a neutral, "transcendental" matrix of an open struggle whose content and stakes are themselves defined by the contingent struggle for hegemony, while the class struggle presupposes a particular social group (the working class) as a privileged political agent; this privilege is not itself the outcome of hegemonic struggle but grounded in the "objective social position" of this group-the ideologico-political struggle is thus ultimately reduced to an epiphenomenon of "objective" social processes, powers, and their conflicts. For Laclau, on the contrary, the fact that some particular struggle is elevated into the "universal equivalent" of all struggles is not a predetermined fact but itself the result of the contingent political struggle for hegemony. In some constellation, this struggle can be the workers' struggle, in another constellation, the patriotic anticolonialist struggle, in yet another constellation, the antiracist struggle for cultural tolerance. There is nothing in the inherent positive qualities of some particular struggle that predestines it for such a hegemonic role as the "general equivalent" of all struggles. The struggle for hegemony thus not only presupposes an irreducible gap between the universal form and the multiplicity of particular contents but also the contingent process by means of which one among these contents is "transubstantiated" into the immediate embodiment of the universal dimension; say (Laclau's own example), in Poland of the 1980s, the particular demands of Solidarnosc were elevated into the embodiment of the people's global rejection of the Communist regime, so that all different versions of the anti-Communist opposition (from the conservativenationalist opposition through the liberal-democratic opposition and cultural dissidence to leftist workers' opposition) recognized themselves in the empty signifier Solidarnosc. This is how Laclau tries to distinguish his position both from gradualism (which reduces the very dimension of the political; all that remains is the gradual realization of particular "democratic" demands within the differential social space) and from the opposite idea of a total revolution that would bring about a fully self-reconciled society. What both extremes miss is the struggle for hegemony in which a particular demand is elevated to the dignity of the Thing or comes to stand for the universality of "people." The field of politics is thus caught in an irreducible tension between empty and floating signifiers; some particular signifiers start to function as empty, directly embodying the universal dimension, incorporating into the chain of equivalences, which they totalize, a large number of floating 3. This distinction is homologous to that deployed by Michael Walzer, between "thin" and "thick" morality; see Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Ind., 1994) . He gives the example of the big demonstration in the streets of Prague in 1989 that toppled the Communist regime; most of the banners read simply "Truth," "Justice," or "Freedom," general slogans even the ruling Communists had to agree with; the catch was, of course, in the underlying web of "thick" (specific, determinate) demands (freedom of the press, multiparty elections, and so on) that indicated what the people meant by the simple general slogans. In short, the struggle was not simply for freedom and justice but for the meaning of these words.
signifiers.
3 Laclau mobilizes this gap between the "ontological" need for a populist protest vote (conditioned by the fact that the hegemonic power discourse cannot incorporate a series of popular demands) and the contingent ontic content to which this vote gets attached to explain the shift of many French voters in the 1970s from the Communist Party to the rightist populism of the Front National. The elegance of this solution is that it dispenses with the boring topic of the alleged deeper (totalitarian, of course) solidarity between the extreme Right and the "extreme" Left (see OPR, p. 88).
Although Laclau's theory of populism stands out as one of today's great (and, unfortunately for social theory, rare) examples of true conceptual stringency, one should note a couple of problematic features. The first one concerns his very definition of populism. The series of formal conditions he enumerates are not sufficient to justify calling a phenomenon populist; one needs also to consider the way in which populist discourse displaces the antagonism and constructs the enemy. In populism, the enemy is externalized or reified into a positive ontological entity (even if this entity is spectral) whose annihilation would restore balance and justice; symmetrically, our own-the populist political agent's-identity is also perceived as preexisting the enemy's onslaught. Let us take Laclau's own precise analysis of why one should count Chartism as populism: "Its dominant leitmotiv is to situate the evils of society not in something that is inherent in the economic system, but quite the opposite: in the abuse of power by parasitic and speculative groups which have control of political power-'old corruption,' in Cobbett's words. . . . It was for this reason that the feature most strongly picked out in the ruling class was its idleness and parasitism" (OPR, p. 90) .
In other words, for a populist, the cause of the troubles is ultimately never the system as such but the intruder who corrupted it (financial manipulators, not necessarily capitalists, and so on); not a fatal flaw inscribed into the structure as such but an element that doesn't play its role within the structure properly. For a Marxist, on the contrary (as for a Freudian), the pathological (deviating misbehavior of some elements) is the symptom of the normal, an indicator of what is wrong in the very structure that is threatened with "pathological" outbursts. For Marx, economic crises are the key to understanding the "normal" functioning of capitalism; for Freud, pathological phenomena like hysterical outbursts provide the key to the constitution (and hidden antagonisms that sustain the functioning) of a "normal" subject. This is also why fascism definitely is a kind of populism. Its figure of the Jew is the equivalential point of the series of (heterogeneous, inconsistent even) threats experienced by individuals; the Jew is simultaneously too intellectual, dirty, sexually voracious, too hardworking, too much the financial exploiter. Here we encounter another key feature of populism not mentioned by Laclau. He rightly emphasizes that the populist master signifier for the enemy is empty, vague, imprecise, and so on:
To say that the oligarchy is responsible for the frustration of social demands is not to state something which can possibly be read out of the social demands themselves; it is provided from outside those social demands, by a discourse on which they can be inscribed. . . . It is here that the moment of emptiness necessarily arises, following the establishment of equivalential bonds. Ergo, "vagueness" and "imprecision," but these do not result from any kind of marginal or primitive situation; they are inscribed in the very nature of the political. [OPR, In populism proper, however, this "abstract" character is always supplemented by the pseudoconcreteness of the figure that is selected as the enemy, the singular agent behind all threats to the people. Today one can buy laptops with the keyboard artificially imitating the resistance to the fingers of the old typewriter, as well as the typewriter sound of the letter hitting the paper. What better example of the recent need for pseudoconcreteness? Today, when not only social relations but also technology are getting more and more opaque (who can visualize what is going on inside a PC?), there is a great need to recreate an artificial concreteness in order to enable individuals to relate to their complex environs as to a meaningful life-world. In computer programming, this step-the pseudoconcreteness of icons-was accomplished by Apple. Guy Debord's old formula about the "society of spectacle" is thus getting a new twist: images are created in order to fill in the gap that separates the new artificial universe from our old life-world surroundings, in other words, to domesticate this new universe. And is the pseudoconcrete populist figure of the Jew that condenses the vast multitude of anonymous forces that determine us not analogous to a computer's keyboard that imitates the old typewriter board? The Jew-as-enemy definitely emerges from outside the social demands that experience themselves as frustrated.
This supplement to Laclau's definition of populism in no way implies 4. Many people sympathetic to Hugo Chavez's regime in Venezuela like to oppose Chavez's flamboyant and sometimes clownish caudillo style to the vast popular movement of the selforganization of the poor and dispossessed that surprisingly brought him back to power after he was deposed in a U.S.-backed coup; the error of this view is to think that one can have the second without the first. The popular movement needs the identificatory figure of a charismatic leader. The limitation of Chavez lies elsewhere, in the very factor that enables him to play his role: oil money. It is as if oil is always a mixed blessing, if not an outright curse. Because of this supply he can go on making populist gestures without paying the full price for them, without really inventing something new at the socioeconomic level. Money makes it possible for him to practice inconsistent politics (to enforce populist anticapitalist measures and leave the capitalist edifice basically untouched), of not acting but postponing the act, the radical change. any kind of regress at the ontic level; we remain at the formal-ontological level and, while accepting Laclau's thesis that populism is a certain formal political logic, not bounded by any content, only supplement it with the characteristic (no less "transcendental" than its other features) of "reifying" antagonism into a positive entity. As such, populism by definition contains a minimum, an elementary form, of ideological mystification, which is why, although it is effectively a formal frame or matrix of political logic that can be given different political twists (reactionary-nationalist, progressive-nationalist), nonetheless, insofar as, in its very notion, it displaces the immanent social antagonism into the antagonism between the unified people and its external enemy, it harbors in the last instance a long-term protofascist tendency.
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This is also why it is problematic to count any kind of communist movement as a version of populism. After evoking the possibility that the point of shared identification that holds together a crowd can shift from the person of the leader to an impersonal idea, Freud goes on: "This abstraction, again, might be more or less completely embodied in the figure of what we might call a secondary leader, and interesting varieties would arise from the relation between the idea and the leader."
5 Does this not hold especially for the Stalinist leader who, in contrast to the fascist leader, is a "secondary leader," the embodiment-instrument of the communist Idea? This is the reason communist movements and regimes cannot be categorized as populist.
There are further weaknesses in Laclau's analysis. The smallest unit of his analysis of populism is the category of social demand (in the double meaning of the term: a request and a claim). The strategic reason for choosing this term is clear: the subject of demand is constituted through raising this demand; the people thus constitutes itself through an equivalential chain of demands. It is the performative result of raising these demands, 6 . See, especially, Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London, 2000) . not a preexisting group. However, the term demand involves a whole theatrical scene in which a subject is addressing his demand to an Other presupposed to be able to meet it. Does the proper revolutionary or emancipatory political act not move beyond this horizon of demands? The revolutionary subject no longer operates at the level of demanding something from those in power; he wants to destroy them. Furthermore, Laclau calls such an elementary demand, prior to its eventual enchainment into a series of equivalences, democratic; as he explains it, he resorts to this slightly idiosyncratic use to signal a demand that still functions within the sociopolitical system or a demand that is met as a particular demand so that it is not frustrated and, because of this frustration, forced to inscribe itself into an antagonistic series of equivalences. Although he emphasizes how, in a "normal" institutionalized political space, there are, of course, multiple conflicts-dealt with one by one, without setting in motion any transversal alliances or antagonisms-Laclau is well aware that chains of equivalences can also form themselves within an institutionalized democratic space. Recall how, in the U.K. under John Major's Conservative leadership in the late 1980s, the figure of the unemployed single mother was elevated into the universal symbol of what was wrong with the old welfare state system; all social evils were somehow reduced to this figure. (The state budget crisis? Too much money is spent on supporting these mothers and their children. Juvenile delinquency? Single mothers do not exert enough authority to provide the proper educational discipline. And so on.)
What Laclau neglects to emphasize is not only the uniqueness of democracy with regard to his basic conceptual opposition between the logic of differences (society as a global regulated system) and the logic of equivalences (the social space as split into two antagonistic camps that equalize their inner differences) but also the full inner entwinement of these two logics. The first thing to note here is how, only in a democratic political system, the antagonistic logic of equivalences is inscribed into the very political edifice, as its basic structural feature. It seems that Chantal Mouffe's work is here more pertinent, 6 in its heroic attempt to bring together democracy and the spirit of agonistic struggle, rejecting both extremes: on the one side, the celebration of heroic struggle-confrontation that suspends democracy and its rules (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Schmitt); on the other side, the evacuation of true struggle out of the democratic space so that all that remains is anemic rule-regulated competition (Habermas). Here, Mouffe is right to point out how violence returns with a vengeance in the exclusion of those who do not fit the rules of unconstrained communication. How-ever, the main threat to democracy in today's democratic countries resides in neither of these two extremes, but in the death of the political through the "commodification" of politics. What is at stake here is not primarily the way politicians are packed and sold as merchandise at elections; a much deeper problem is that elections themselves are conceived along the lines of buying a commodity (power, in this case); they involve a competition among different merchandise-parties, and our votes are like money that we give to buy the government we want. What gets lost in such a view of politics, as another service we buy, is politics as a shared public debate of issues and decisions that concern us all.
Democracy, it may seem, thus not only can include antagonism; it is the only political form that solicits and presupposes it, that institutionalizes it. What other political systems perceive as a threat (the lack of a "natural" pretender to power), democracy elevates into a "normal" positive condition of its functioning. The place of power is empty, there is no natural claimant for it, polemos or struggle is irreducible, and every positive governmentmust be fought out, gained through polemos. This why Laclau's critical remark about Lefort misses the point: "For Lefort, the place of power in democracies is empty. For me, the question poses itself differently: it is a question of producing emptiness out of the operation of hegemonic logic. For me, emptiness is a type of identity, not a structural location" (OPR, p. 166). The two emptinesses are simply not comparable. The emptiness of people is the emptiness of the hegemonic signifier that totalizes the chain of equivalences or whose particular content is "transubstantiated" into an embodiment of the social Whole, while the emptiness of the place of power is a distance that makes every empirical bearer of power deficient, contingent, and temporary.
A further feature neglected by Laclau is the fundamental paradox of authoritarian fascism, which almost symmetrically inverts what Mouffe calls the democratic paradox. If the wager of (institutionalized) democracy is to integrate the antagonistic struggle itself into the institutional and differential space, transforming it into regulated agonism, fascism proceeds in the opposite direction. While fascism, in its mode of activity, brings the antagonistic logic to its extreme (talking about the struggle to death between itself and its enemies, and always maintaining-if not realizing-a minimum of an extra-institutional threat of violence, of a direct pressure of the people bypassing complex legal-institutional channels), it posits as its political goal precisely the opposite, an extremely ordered hierarchic social body (no wonder fascism always relies on organicist-corporatist metaphors). This contrast can be nicely rendered in the terms of the Lacanian opposition between the subject of enunciation and the subject of the enun-ciated (content). While democracy admits antagonistic struggle as its goal (in Lacanese: as its enunciated, its content), its procedure is regulated-systemic; fascism, on the contrary, tries to impose the goal of hierarchically structured harmony through the means of an unbridled antagonism.
The conclusion to be drawn is that populism (the way we supplemented Laclau's definition of it) is not the only mode of existence of the excess of antagonism over the institutional-democratic frame of regulated agonistic struggle. Not only the (now defunct) communist revolutionary organizations, but also the wide phenomena of noninstitutionalized social and political protest, from the student movements in the 1968 period to later antiwar protests and the more recent antiglobalization movement, cannot be properly called populist. Exemplary here is the case of the antisegregation movement in the U.S. of the late 1950s and early 1960s, epitomized by the work of Martin Luther King; although it endeavored to articulate a demand that was not properly met within the existing democratic institutions, it cannot be called populist in any meaningful sense of the term. The way it led the struggle and constituted its opponent was simply not populist. (A more general remark should be made here about one-issue popular movements. Take, for example, the "tax revolts" in the U.S. Although they function in a populist way, mobilizing the people around a demand that is not met by the democratic institutions, it does not seem to rely on a complex chain of equivalences, but remains focused on one singular demand.)
To the Deadlock of Political Engagements
In 2004, George Lakoff, a post-Chomskian philosopher of language previously known mostly as a metaphor analyst, all of a sudden exploded into popularity in the U.S. Democratic Party by offering an elementary, easy-touse account of what was wrong with the Democrats' politics and how this politics should be redressed to resuscitate its mobilizing force. The interest of his project for us resides in the fact that it shares a series of superficial features with Laclau's edifice: the move from political struggle as a conflict of agents who follow rational calculations about their self-interests to a more open vision of political struggle as a conflict of passions sustained by an irreducibly metaphorical rhetoric. (For Laclau, metaphor is inscribed into the very heart of the struggle for ideologico-political hegemony; the fundamental operation of hegemony, the elevation of some particular content into a direct embodiment of universality, literally enacts a metaphoric short circuit.)
One should remember here that Lakoff is a true anti-Chomskian who believes in telling all the facts and in the power of clear reasoning (no wonder there is professional and personal animosity between him and Chomsky, his ex-teacher). Lakoff opts for a strangely anti-Enlightenment vision that turns around the so-called rationalist-materialist paradigm. People don't follow rational calculations about their self-interests; they think in subconscious narrative frames organized around central metaphors; their beliefs are sustained by such frames, not by rational argumentation. We are back at the old opposition of myth versus logos, rhetoric versus reasoning, metaphor versus strict conceptual meaning. Lakoff 's concrete analyses oscillate between amusing aperçus on how everyday rhetorical phrases are bundled with unspoken assumptions (for example, in the 2004 elections, the media as a rule referred to Kerry's home as his estate and to Bush's as a ranch) and rather primitive pseudo-Freudian decipherings. Apropos of 9/11, he writes: "Towers are symbols of phallic power, and their collapse reinforces the idea of loss of power. . . . The planes penetrating the towers with a plume of heat, and the Pentagon, a vaginal image from the air, penetrated by the plane as missile." 7 In view of this naïve Freudism, it should not surprise us that, for Lakoff, the central organizing metaphors go back to warring visions of idealized family structure. Conservatives see the nation as a family based on the strict father model, in which the head of the household orders his wife around and beats his children with the goal of fashioning them into disciplined and self-reliant adults, while progressives prefer a nurturing parents model in which two mutually supportive parents nurture their children. (As it has already been noted, both the strict father and the nurturing parents models are family models, as if it is impossible to detach politics from its familial fantasmatic libidinal roots.)
Lakoff 's conclusion is that, instead of abhorring passionate metaphoric language on behalf of rational argumentation and abstract moralizing, the Left should accept the battle on this terrain and learn to offer more seductive frames.
8 Near the end of Don't Think of an Elephant! Lakoff writes that conservatives "have figured out their own values, principles, and directions,and have gotten them out in the public mind so effectively over the past thirty years that they can evoke them all in a ten-word philosophy: StrongDefense, Free Markets, Lower Taxes, Smaller Government, Family Values." He proposes a similar ten-word philosophy for liberals: "Stronger America, Broad Prosperity, Better Future, Effective Government, Mutual Responsibility." adoption of divisive positions (a strong defense against the proponents of disarmament; free markets against state regulation; lower taxes against taxand-spend social programs, and so on), the liberal formula consists of general, feel-good phrases nobody is against (who is against prosperity, better future, effective government?). All that happens is that violent-passionate engaging rhetoric is replaced by shallow, sentimental rhetoric. What is so strange here is that Lakoff, a refined linguist, a specialist in semantics, can miss this obvious weakness of his positive formula, a weakness that can be precisely formulated in Laclau's terms: it lacks the antagonistic charge of designating a clear enemy, which is the sine qua non of every effective mobilizing political formula.
So we are far from insinuating that Lakoff proposes a "Laclauian" politics. On the contrary, it is precisely the reference to Laclau that allows us to see Lakoff 's limitations beneath the superficial similarities. According to Senator Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), one of Lakoff 's supporters in the Democratic nomenklatura, Lakoff doesn't ask us to change our views or change our philosophy. He tells us that we have to recommunicate. The Republicans have triumphed by repackaging old ideas in all new wrapping. The struggle is thus reduced to mere rhetoric. The ideas (and the "real" politics) remain the same; it is only a question of how to package and sell them (or, to put it in more "human" terms, of establishing better communication). Insofar as he endorses such a reading of his thesis, Lakoff doesn't take seriously enough his own emphasis on the force of metaphoric frame, reducing it to secondary packaging-in clear contrast to Laclau, for whom the rhetoric is operative in the very heart of the ideologico-political process, in establishing the hegemonic articulation-although, sometimes, Laclau does seem to succumb to the temptation of reducing the troubles of today's Left to a "mere rhetorical" failure, as in the following passage:
The Right and the Left are not fighting at the same level. On the one hand, there is an attempt by the Right to articulate various problems that people have into some kind of political imaginary, and on the other hand, there is a retreat by the Left into a purely moral discourse which doesn't enter into the hegemonic game. . . . The main difficulty of the Left is that the fight today does not take place at that level of the political imaginary. And it relies on a rationalist discourse about rights, conceived in a purely abstract way without entering that hegemonic field, and without that engagement there is no possibility of a progressive political alternative. So the main problem of the Left is its inability to propose a passionate global vision of change. Is it really that simple? Is the solution for the Left to abandon "purely moral" rationalist discourse and to propose a more engaged vision addressing the political imaginary, a vision that could compete with the neoconservative projects and also with past leftist visions? Is this diagnosis not similar to the proverbial answer of a doctor to the worried patient: "What you need is a good doctor's advice!"? What about asking the elementary question: what, concretely, would that new leftist vision be, with regard to its content? Is not the decline of the traditional Left, its retreat into the moral rationalist discourse that no longer enters the hegemonic game, conditioned by big changes in the global economy in the last decades? So where is a better leftist global solution to our present predicament? Whatever one holds against the "third way," it at least tried to propose a vision that does take into account these changes. No wonder that, as we approach concrete political analysis, confusion starts to reign. In a recent interview, Laclau made a weird accusation against me, imputing that I claimed that the problem with the United States is that they act as a global power and do not think as a global power, but only in the terms of their own interests. The solution is then that they should think and act as a global power, that they should assume their role of world policeman. For somebody like Zizek, who comes from the Hegelian tradition, to say this means that the United States tends to be the universal class. . . . The function that Hegel attributes to the State and Marx to the proletariat, Zizek now attributes to the highpoint of American imperialism. There is no base for thinking that things will be this way. I do not believe that any progressive cause, in any part of the world, could think in these terms.
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I quote this passage not to dwell on its ridiculously malicious interpretive twist; of course I never pleaded for the U.S. to be the universal class. When I stated that the U.S. acts globally and thinks locally, my point was not that they should both think and act globally. It was simply that this gap between universality and particularity is structurally necessary, which is why the U.S. is in the long term digging its own grave. And, incidentally, therein resides my Hegelianism: the "motor" of the historico-dialectical process is precisely the gap between acting and thinking. People do not do what they think they are doing; while thought is formally universal, the act as such is particularizing, which is why, precisely for Hegel, there is no self-transparenthistorical subject. All acting social subjects are always and by definition caught 12. Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis, 1998), p. 23.
13. The best anecdotal example of what is wrong with the first mode of universality is the story, from World War I, about a working-class English soldier on leave from the front, enraged by encountering an upper-class youth calmly leading a life of exquisite "Britishness" (tea rituals and so on), not perturbed by the war at all. When he explodes against the youth, "How can you just sit here and enjoy it, while we are sacrificing our blood to defend our way of life?" the youth calmly responds: "But I am the way of life you are defending there in the trenches!" in the cunning of reason, fulfilling their role through the very failure to accomplish their intended task. Consequently, the gap we are dealing with here is also not simply the gap between the universal form of thought and the particular interests that effectively sustain our acts legitimized by universal thought. The true Hegelian insight is that the very universal form as such, in its opposition to the particular content that it excludes, particularizes itself, turns into its opposite, so there is no need to look for some particular pathological content that smears pure universality.
The reason I quote this passage is to make a precise theoretical point about the status of universality; we are dealing here with two opposed logics of universality to be strictly distinguished. On the one hand, there is the state bureaucracy as the universal class of a society (or, in a larger scope, the U.S. as the world policeman, the universal enforcer and guarantor of human rights and democracy), the direct agent of the global order; on the other hand, there is the "surnumerary" universality, the universality embodied in the element that sticks out of the existing order, which, while internal to it, has no proper place within it (what Jacques Rancière calls the "part of nopart").
12 Not only are the two not the same but the struggle is ultimately between these two universalities-not simply between the particular elements of the universality, not just about which particular content will hegemonize the empty form of universality, but between two exclusive forms of universality themselves.
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This is why Laclau misses the point when he opposes working class and people along the axis of conceptual content versus the effect of radical nomination: working class designates a preexisting social group, characterized by its substantial content, while people emerges as a unified agent through the very act of nomination. There is nothing in the heterogeneity of demands that predisposes them to be unified in people (see OPR, p. 183). However, Marx distinguishes between working class and proletariat: working class effectively is a particular social group, while proletariat designates a subjective position. (This is why Laclau's critical debate about Marx's opposition between proletariat and lumpenproletariat also misses the point; the distinction is not one between an objective social group and a nongroup, a remainder-excess with no proper place within the social edifice, but a distinction between two modes of this remainder-excess that generates two different subjective positions.) The implication of Marx's analysis is that, paradoxically, although lumpenproletariat seems more radically displaced with regard to the social body than proletariat, it effectively fits much more smoothly the social edifice. To refer to the Kantian distinction between negative and infinite judgment, lumpenproletariat is not truly a nongroup (the immanent negation of a group, a group that is a nongroup), but not a group, and its exclusion from all strata not only consolidates the identity of other groups but also makes it a free-floating element that can be used by any strata or class. It can be the radicalizing carnivalesque element of the workers' struggle, pushing them from compromising moderate strategies to an open confrontation, or the element that is used by the ruling class to suppress from within the opposition to its rule (the long tradition of the criminal mob serving those in power). The working class, on the contrary, is a group that is in itself, as a group within the social edifice, a nongroup, in other words, one whose position is in itself contradictory;they are a productive force. Society (and those in power) needs them in order to reproduce themselves and their rule, but, nonetheless, they cannot find a proper place for them.
This brings us to Laclau's basic reproach to the Marxian critique of political economy (CPE): it is a positive "ontic" science that delimits a part of substantial social reality, so that any direct grounding of emancipatory politics in CPE (or, in other words, any privilege given to class struggle) reduces the political to an epiphenomenon embedded in substantial reality. Such a view misses what Derrida called the spectral dimension of Marx's CPE; far from offering the ontology of a determinate social domain, the CPE demonstrates how this ontology is always supplemented by "heauntology," the science of ghosts-what Marx calls the metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties of the universe of commodities. This strange spirit or ghost resides in the very heart of economic reality, which is why, with the CPE, the circle of Marx's critique is closed. Marx's initial thesis, in his early works, was that the critique of religion is the starting point of every critique; from here, he proceeded to the critique of state and politics and, finally, to the CPE, which gives us the insight into the most basic mechanism of social reproduction. However, at this final point, the movement becomes circular and returns to its starting point, or what we discover in the very heart of this hard economic reality is again the theological dimension. When Marx describes the mad self-enhancing circulation of capital, whose solipsistic path of self-fecundation reaches its apogee in today's metareflexive speculations on futures, it is far too simplistic to claim that the specter of this selfengendering monster that pursues its path disregarding any human or environmental concern is an ideological abstraction and that one should never forget that, behind this abstraction, there are real people and natural objects on whose productive capacities and resources capital's circulation is based and on which it feeds itself like a gigantic parasite. The problem is that this abstraction is not only in our (financial speculator's)misperception of social reality but that it is real in the precise sense of determining the structure of the very material social processes. The fate of whole strata of population and sometimes of whole countries can be decided by the solipsistic speculative dance of capital, which pursues its goal of profitability in a blessed indifference with regard to how its movement will affect social reality. Therein resides the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, much more uncanny than direct precapitalist socioideological violence. This violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their "evil" intentions but is purely objective, systemic, anonymous. Here we encounter the Lacanian difference between reality and the Real: reality is the social reality of actual people involved in interaction and in the productive processes, while the Real is the inexorable abstract spectral logic of capital that determines what goes on in social reality.
Furthermore, let us not forget what the very term CPE indicates: economy is in itself political so that one cannot reduce political struggle to a mere epiphenomenon or secondary effect of a more basic economic social process. This is what class struggle is for Marx: the presence of the political in the very heart of economy, which is why it is significant that the manuscript of the third volume of Capital breaks precisely when Marx would have to deal directly with class struggle. This break is not simply a lack, the signal of a failure, but, rather, the signal that the line of thought bends back into itself, turns to a dimension that was always-already here. The political class struggle permeates the entire analysis from the very beginning; the categories of political economy (say, the value of the commodity working force, or the degree of profit) are not objective socioeconomic data but data that always signal the outcome of a political struggle. And, incidentally, in dealing with the Real, Laclau seems to oscillate between the formal notion of the Real as antagonism and the more empirical notion of the Real as that which cannot be reduced to a formal opposition: "The opposition A-B will never fully become A-not A. The 'B-ness' of the B will be ultimately nondialectizable. The 'people' will always be something more than the pure opposite of power. There is a Real of the 'people' which resists symbolic integration" (OPR, p. 152).
The crucial question of course is what, exactly, is the character of this excess of people over being the "pure opposite of power," or, What in people resists symbolic integration? Is it simply the wealth of its (empirical or other) determinations? If this is the case, then we are not dealing with a Real that resists symbolic integration because the Real, in this case, is precisely the antagonism A-non-A, so that "that which is in B more than non-A" is not the Real in B, but B's symbolic determinations.
Capitalism is thus not merely a category that delimits a positive social sphere but a formal-transcendental matrix that structures the entire social space-literally, a mode of production. Its strength resides in its very weakness; it is pushed into constant dynamics, into a kind of permanent emergency state, in order to avoid confronting its basic antagonism, its structural imbalance. As such, it is ontologically open; it reproduces itself through its permanent self-overcoming. It is as if it were indebted to its own future, borrowing from it and forever postponing the day of reckoning.
The Turkish March
The general conclusion is that, although the topic of populism is emerging as crucial in today's political scenery, it cannot be used as grounds for the renewal of emancipatory politics. The first thing to note is that today's populism is different from the traditional version. What distinguishes it is the opponent against which it mobilizes the people: the rise of "postpolitics," the reduction of politics proper to the rational administration of conflicting interests. In the highly developed countries of Western Europe and in the U.S., at least, populism is emerging as the inherent shadowy double of institutionalized postpolitics; one is almost tempted to say it is its supplement in the Derridean sense, the arena in which political demands that do not fit the institutionalized space can be articulated. In this sense, there is a constitutive mystification that pertains to populism. Its basic gesture is to refuse to confront the complexity of the situation, to reduce it to a clear struggle with a pseudoconcrete enemy figure (from Brussels bureaucracy to illegal immigrants). Populism is thus by definition a negative phenomenon, a phenomenon grounded in a refusal, even an implicit admission of impotence. We all know the old joke about a guy looking for a lost set of keys under a streetlight: when asked where he lost them, he says, "in a dark corner." So why is he looking for them under the light? Because the visibility is much better there. There is always something of this trick in populism. So not only is populism not the area within which today's emancipatory projects should inscribe themselves, one should go a step further and propose that the main task of today's emancipatory politics, its life-and-death problem, is to find a form of political mobilization that, although (like populism) critical of institutionalized politics, avoids the populist temptation.
Where, then, does all this leave us with regard to Europe's imbroglio? The French voters were not given a clear symmetrical choice, as the very terms of the choice privileged the yes. The elite proposed to the people a 14. The limitation of postpolitics is best exemplified not only by the success of rightist populism but by the U.K. elections of 2005; in spite of the growing unpopularity of Tony Blair (he was and continues to be voted the most unpopular person in the U.K.), there is no way for this discontent to find a politically effective expression; such frustration can only foment dangerous extraparliamentary explosions.
choice that was effectively no choice at all; people were called to ratify the inevitable, the result of enlightened expertise. The media and the political elite presented the choice as one between knowledge and ignorance, between expertise and ideology, between postpolitical administration and the old political passions of the Left and the Right.
14 The no was thus dismissed as a shortsighted reaction unaware of its own consequences, a murky reaction of fear of the emerging postindustrial global order, an instinct to stick to and protect the comfortable welfare state traditions, a gesture of refusal lacking any positive alternative program. No wonder the only political parties whose official stance was no were those at the opposite extremes of the political spectrum: le Pen's Front National on the right and the Communists and Trotskyites on the left.
However, even if there is an element of truth in all this, the very fact that the no was not sustained by a coherent alternative political vision is the strongest possible condemnation of the political and mediatic elite-a monument to their inability to articulate, to translate into a political vision, the people's longings and dissatisfactions. Instead, in their reaction to the no, they treated the people like slow pupils who did not get the lesson of the experts; their self-criticism was the one of the teacher who admits that he failed to educate his pupils. What the advocates of this "communication" thesis (the French and Dutch no means that the enlightened elite failed to communicate properly with the masses) fail to see is that, on the contrary, the no in question was a perfect example of communication in which, as Lacan put it, the speaker gets from the addressee its own message in its inverted or true form; the enlightened European bureaucrats got back from their voters the shallowness of their own message to them in its true form. The project of the European Union that was rejected by France and the Netherlands stood for a kind of cheap trick, as if Europe can redeem itself and beat its competitors by simply combining the best of both worlds-by beating the U.S., China, and Japan in scientific-technological modernization through keeping alive its cultural traditions. One should insist here that if Europe is to redeem itself it should, on the contrary, be ready to take the risk of losing (in the sense of radically questioning) both: to dispel the fetish of scientific-technological progress and to get rid of its reliance upon the superiority of its cultural heritage.
So, although the choice was not one between two political options, it was also not a choice between the enlightened vision of a modern Europe, ready to fit the new global order, and old confused political passions. When commentators described the no as a message of confused fear, they were wrong. The main fear we are dealing with here is the fear the no itself provoked in the new European political elite, the fear that people will no longer so easily buy their postpolitical vision. For all others, the no is a message and expression of hope-hope that politics is still alive and possible, that the debate about what the new Europe shall and should be is still open. This is why we, from the Left, should reject the sneering insinuation by the liberals that, in our no we find ourselves with strange neo-fascist bedfellows. What the new populist Right and the Left share is just one thing: the awareness that politics proper is still alive.
There was a positive choice in the no: the choice of choice itself, refusing to be blackmailed by the new elite who offer us only the choice to confirm their expert knowledge or to display our "irrational" immaturity. The no is the positive decision to start a properly political debate about what kind of Europe we really want. Late in his life, Freud asked the famous question, What does the woman want? (Was will das Weib?), admitting his perplexity when faced with the enigma of feminine sexuality. Does the imbroglio with the European constitution not bear witness to the same puzzlement: which Europe do we want?
The unofficial anthem of the European Union, heard at numerous political, cultural, and sporting events, is the "Ode to Joy" melody from the last movement of Beethoven's ninth symphony, a true empty signifier that can stand for anything. In France, it was elevated by Romain Rolland into a humanist ode to the brotherhood of all people ("the Marseillaise of humanity"); in 1938, it was performed as the highpoint of Reichsmusiktage and also for Hitler's birthday; during the Cultural Revolution in China, in the atmosphere of rejecting European classics, it was redeemed as a piece of progressive class struggle; and in today's Japan it has achieved cult status, being woven into the very social fabric with its alleged message of joy through suffering. Until the 1970s, or during the time when both West and East German Olympic teams had to perform together as one German team, "Ode to Joy" was played during the presentation of Germany's gold medal, and, simultaneously, the Rhodesian white supremacist regime of Ian Smith, which proclaimed independence in the late 1960s in order to maintain apartheid, also proclaimed the same song its national anthem. Even Abimael Guzman, the (now imprisoned) leader of the Sendero Luminoso, when asked what music he loved, mentioned the fourth movement of Beethoven's Ninth. So we can easily imagine a fictional performance at which all sworn 15. See Nicholas Cook, Beethoven: Symphony No. 9 (Cambridge, Mass., 2003) ; hereafter abbreviated B.
16. Some critics even compare the "absurd grunts" of the bassoons and bass drum that accompany the beginning of the marcia Turca to farts; see B, p. 103. enemies, from Hitler to Stalin, from Bush to Saddam, for a moment forget their adversities and participate in the same magic moment of ecstatic brotherhood.
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However, before we dismiss the fourth movement as a piece destroyed through social usage, let us note some peculiarities of its structure. In the middle of the movement, after we hear the main melody in three orchestral and three vocal variations, at this first climax, something unexpected happens which has bothered critics since its first performance 180 years ago: at bar 331, the tone changes totally, and, instead of the solemn hymnic progression, the same "Joy" theme is repeated in the Turkish march (marcia Turca) style, borrowed from the military music for wind and percussion instruments that eighteenth-century European armies adopted from the Turkish Janissaries. The mode is here that of a carnivalesque popular parade, a mocking spectacle, 16 and, after this point, everything goes wrong. The simple solemn dignity of the first part of the movement is never recovered. After this "Turkish" part and in a clear countermovement to it, in a kind of retreat into the innermost religiosity, the choral-like music (dismissed by some critics as a Gregorian fossil) tries to render the ethereal image of millions of people who kneel down embraced, contemplating in awe the distant sky and searching for the loving paternal God who must dwell above the canopy of stars ("überm Sternenzelt Muss ein lieber Vater wohnen") (B, p. 108); however, the music as it were gets stuck when the word muss, first rendered by the basses, is repeated by the tenors and altos and finally by the sopranos, as if this repeated conjuring presents a desperate attempt to convince us (and itself) of what it knows is not true, making the line "there must dwell a loving Father" (B, p. 109) into a desperate act of beseeching and thus attesting to the fact that there is nothing beyond the canopy of stars, no loving father to protect us and to guarantee our brotherhood. After this, a return to a more celebratory mood is attempted in the guise of the double fugue that cannot but sound false in its excessively artificial brilliance, a fake synthesis if there ever was one, a desperate attempt to cover up the void of the absent God revealed in the previous section. But the final cadenza is the strangest of them all, sounding not at all like Beethoven but more a puffed up version of the finale of Mozart's Abduction from the Seraglio, combining "Turkish" elements with the fast rococo spectacle. (And let us not forget the lesson of Mozart's opera: the figure of the oriental despot is presented as a true enlightened Master.) The finale is thus a weird mixture of Orientalism and regression into late eighteenth-century classicism, a double retreat from the historical present, a silent admission of the purely fantasmatic character of the joy of all-encompassing brotherhood. If there ever was a music that literally deconstructs itself, this is it. The contrast between the highly ordered linear progression of the first part of the movement and the precipitous, heterogeneous, and inconsistent character of the second cannot be stronger. No wonder that already in 1826, two years after its first performance, some reviewers described the finale as "a festival of hatred towards all that can be called human joy. With gigantic strength the perilous hoard emerges, tearing hearts asunder and darkening the divine spark of gods with noisy, monstrous mocking" (B, p. 93). (Of course, these lines are not meant as a criticism of Beethoven; quite the contrary, in an Adornian mode, one should discern in this failure of the fourth movement Beethoven's artistic integrity: the truthful indexing of the failure of the very Enlightenment project of universal brotherhood.)
Beethoven's Ninth is thus full of what Nicholas Cook calls "unconsummated symbols": elements that are in excess of the global meaning of the work (or of the movement in which they occur), that do not fit this meaning, although it is not clear what additional meaning they bring (B, p. 103). Cook lists the "funeral march" at bar 513 of the first movement, the abrupt ending of the second movement, the military tones in the third movement, the so-called "horror fanfares," the Turkish march, and many other moments in the fourth movement-all these elements "vibrate with an implied significance that overflows the musical scenario" (B, p. 93). It is not simply that their meaning should be uncovered through an attentive interpretation; the very relation between texture and meaning is inverted here. If the predominant "musical scenario" seems to set into music a clear preestablished meaning (the celebration of joy, the universal brotherhood, and so on), here the meaning is not given in advance but seems to float in some kind of virtual indeterminacy. It is as if we know that there is (or, rather, has to be) some meaning, without ever being able to establish what this meaning is.
What, then, is the solution? The only radical solution is to shift the entire perspective and to render problematic the very first part of the fourth movement. Things do not really go wrong only at bar 331, with the entrance of the marcia Turca; they go wrong from the very beginning. One should accept that there is something insipidly fake in the very "Ode to Joy" so that the chaos that enters after bar 331 is a kind of return of the repressed, from the highest to the lowest (worm) to embrace, the second strophe ominously ends: "But he who cannot rejoice, let him steal weeping away" (Und wer's nie gekonnt, der stehle Weinend sich aus disem Bund) (B, pp. 108-9) . The irony of Beethoven's "Ode to Joy" as the unofficial European anthem is, of course, that the main cause of today's crisis of the union is precisely Turkey. According to most polls, the main reason for those who voted no at the last referendums in France and Netherlands was their opposition to Turkish membership. The no can be grounded in rightist-populist terms (no to the Turkish threat to our culture, no to cheap Turkish immigrant labor) or in liberal-multiculturalist terms (Turkey should not be allowed in because, in its treatment of the Kurds, it doesn't display enough respect for human rights). And the opposite view, the yes, is as false as Beethoven's final cadenza. So, should Turkey be allowed into the union or should it be let to steal itself, weeping, from the union (Bund )? Can Europe survive the "Turkish march"? And, as in the finale of Beethoven's Ninth, what if the true problem is not Turkey but the basic melody itself, the song of European unity as it is played to us from the Brussels postpolitical technocratic elite? What we need is a totally new main melody, a new definition of Europe itself. The problem of Turkey, the perplexity of European Union with regard to what to do with Turkey, is not about Turkey as such but the confusion about what is Europe itself.
What, then, is Europe's predicament today? Europe lies in the great pincers between America on the one side and China on the other. America and China, seen metaphysically, are both the same-the same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and of the rootless organization of the average man. When the farthest corner of the globe has been conquered technically and can be exploited economically; when any incident you like, in any place you like, at any time you like, becomes accessible as fast as you like; when, through live TV coverage, you can simultaneously "experience" a battle in the Iraqi desert and an opera performance in Beijing; when, in a global digital network, time is nothing but speed, instantaneity, and simultaneity; when a winner in a reality TV show counts as the great man of a people; then, yes, there still looms like a specter over all this uproar the question, what for?-where to?-and what then?
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There is thus a need, among Europeans, for what Heidegger called Auseinandersetzung (interpretive confrontation) with others as well as with Europe's own past in all its scope, from its ancient and Judeo-Christian 18. In March 2005, the Pentagon released the summary of a top secret document that sketches America's agenda for global military domination. It calls for a more proactive approach to warfare, beyond the weaker notion of preemptive and defensive actions. It focuses on four core tasks: to build partnerships with failing states to defeat internal terrorist threats; to defend the homeland, including offensive strikes against terrorist groups planning attacks; to influence the choices of countries at a strategic crossroads, such as China and Russia; and to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by hostile states and terrorist groups. Will Europe accept this, satisfied with the role of anemic Greece under the domination of the powerful Roman empire? roots to the recently deceased welfare-state idea. Europe is today split between the so-called Anglo-Saxon model-accept "modernization" (adaptation to the rules of the new global order)-and the French-German model-save as much as possible of the "old European" welfare state. Although opposed, these two options are the sides of the same coin, and our true task is neither to return to any idealized form of the past-these models are clearly exhausted-nor to convince Europeans that, if we are to survive as a world power, we should as fast as possible accommodate ourselves to the recent trends of globalization. Nor is the task what is arguably the worst option, the search for a "creative synthesis" between European traditions and globalization, with the aim to get what one is tempted to call globalization with a European face.
Every crisis is in itself an instigation for a new beginning; every collapse of short-term strategic and pragmatic measures (for financial reorganization of the union, and so on) a blessing in disguise, an opportunity to rethink the very foundations. What we need is a retrieval-through-repetition (Wieder-Holung). Through a critical confrontation with the entire European tradition, one should repeat the question, What is Europe? or, rather, What does it mean for us to be Europeans? and thus formulate a new inception. The task is difficult, it compels us to take a great risk of stepping into the unknown, yet its only alternative is slow decay, the gradual transformation of Europe into what Greece was for the mature Roman Empire, a destination for nostalgic cultural tourism with no effective relevance.
18
And-a further point apropos of which we should risk the hypothesis that Heidegger was right, although not in the sense he meant it-what if democracy is not the answer to this predicament? In his Notes towards a Definition of Culture, the great conservative T. S. Eliot remarked that there are moments when the only choice is the one between sectarianism and nonbelief, when the only way to keep a religion alive is to perform a sectarian split from its main corpse. This is our only chance today. Only by means of a "sectarian split" from the standard European legacy, by severing the decaying corpse of the old Europe, can we keep the renewed European legacy alive. Such a split should render problematic the very premises that we tend to accept as our destiny, as nonnegotiable data of our predicament-the phenomenon usually designated as the global New World Order and the need, through "modernization," to accommodate ourselves to it. To put it bluntly, if the emerging New World Order is the nonnegotiable frame for all of us, then Europe is lost, so the only solution for Europe is to take a risk and break this spell of our destiny. Nothing should be accepted as inviolable in this new foundation, neither the need for economic "modernization" nor the most sacred liberal and democratic fetishes.
So although the French and Dutch no is not sustained by a coherent and detailed alternate vision, it at least clears the space for it, opening up a void that demands to be filled in with new projects-in contrast to the pro-constitution stance that effectively precludes thinking, presenting us with an administrative-political fait accompli. The message of the French no to all of us who care for Europe is a no to anonymous experts whose merchandise is sold to us in a brightly colored liberal-multiculturalist package that will not prevent us from thinking. It is time for us to become aware that we have to make a properly political decision of what we want. No enlightened administrator will do the job for us.
